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USE OF STOCK DIVIDENDS TO AVOID UNDISTRIBUTED
EARNINGS SURTAX
Unless the Supreme Court overrules or modifies its decision in Eisner v.
Macomber there is considerable likelihood that corporations will be unable to
make any extensive use of stock dividends as a means of avoiding the undis-
tributed earnings surtax. Since Congress enacted the provisions for the surtax
in the Income Tax Act of 1936,2 a number of corporations have adopted some
means of avoiding liability for a large tax while retaining the earnings in the
business. It seems generally acknowledged that the only available means of
avoiding the tax are the following: (I) payment of a cash dividend;3 (2) pay-
ment of a cash dividend, accompanied by an offering of the corporation's stock
at a price equal to the amount of the dividend;4 (3) payment of a cash dividend
to owners of part-paid stock, accompanied by a call for the same amount as a
1252 U.S. 189 (1920).
2 Sec. 14, 49 Stat. 1655 (1936); 26 U.S.C.A. § i3a (1936). Hereafter this will be referred to
as the Act; and all section references will be to this act unless otherwise noted.
3 The Act provides a dividends-paid credit equal to the amount of dividends paid, § 27.
This credit reduces the amount of the undistributed net income, which is the amount on which
the surtax is levied.
4 The Supreme Court justices were in agreement in the Eisner case that a cash dividend is
taxable, regardless of the use which is subsequently made of it. The point has since been
tacitly accepted.
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payment on the stock;5 (4) declaration of a dividend to be paid in cash or in
stock of the corporation, at the recipient's option;6 (5) payment of dividends
in stock of the corporation or in stock rights under circumstances which make
the dividend taxable in the hands of the recipient.7 Of these, one of the most
widely discussed and undoubtedly the simplest to employ if actually available
is the payment of taxable stock dividends. The extensive payment of cash
dividends involves too much depletion of cash reserves to suit the purposes of
many corporations. Yet the alternatives which involve optional receipt of
cash or stock are inconvenient devices. The amounts of stock to be taken re-
main indeterminate for some period, which may require expensive underwriting
to insure an adequate cash reserve; and in order to avoid this difficulty by in-
ducing most of the shareholders to accept stock in lieu of cash it may be neces-
sary to make the stock offering extremely attractive.8 Consequently, if the
expedient of taxable stock dividends were practically available many corpora-
tions would undoubtedly make an extensive use of it. Up to the present time
most corporations have adopted one of the other four means, possibly out of
distrust of an untried device. However, some corporations did issue stock
dividends before the close of the 1936 taxable year; 9 and since commentators
have continued to discuss the possibility of a wide practical use of this method
of shifting the tax burden, it may be useful to consider some of the difficulties
which stand in the way of its employment by most corporations as they are at
present capitalized. These are difficulties which, in the case of those corpora-
tions which have issued stock dividends, may give rise to litigation after the
1936 taxes have been assessed.
It seems obvious to most observers that the availability in practice of the
stock dividend method of avoiding surtax liability depends in large part upon
the possibility of issuing taxable dividends to common stockholders. In the
case of corporations which can avoid the surtax through payment of dividends
to their preferred stockholders, no difficulties are apparent. The decision in
Koshland v. Helveringlo and the provision for a dividends-paid credit on all
taxable stock dividends issued solve the problem adequately. Yet it is signifi-
s This device is of little application in the United States, since very few corporations make
use of part-paid stock. The practice is more common in England.
6 This is taxable under § ii~f (2).
" A dividends-paid credit equal to the market value of the shares or rights distributed is
provided in § 27 (e). For a general discussion of these devices, see Graham, The Undistributed
Profits Tax and the Investor, 46 Yale L.J. i (1936).
8 A further difficulty appears in the fact that an unduly attractive option may be held not
a bona fide option but a pure stock dividend which is non-taxable. See note 27 infra.
9 See note ii infra.
10 298 U.S. 441 (1936). Dividends on non-participating preferred stock paid in common
stock were held to constitute income to the stockholders for the reason that the dividend stock
represented a new interest in the corporation, different from the interest represented by the
preferred holdings.
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cant that no extensive use of stock dividends on preferred stock took place
near the close of the 1936 tax period, and that nearly all corporations which
issued stock dividends for the express purpose of avoiding the tax issued pre-
ferred stock to their common stockholders.- The chief reasons for this fact are
rather apparent. It seems clear that any method, to be practicable, must create
a dividends-paid credit nearly equal to the total taxable net income of the cor-
poration. Yet non-participating preferred stock cannot absorb a large propor-
tion of the net earnings of most going concerns; since it is limited in dividends
to a fixed amount and no more, and this amount seldom equals the whole of
the corporation's earnings for the year. Consequently, unless the corporation
is capitalized largely on preferred stock and makes only a moderate return on
its capital, or unless its earnings are so small that its net income is barely more
than enough to pay the preferred dividends, the dividends paid to the preferred
shareholders will not adequately handle the surtax problem. Where participat-
ing preferred stock is outstanding, this difficulty may be less acute; but this
type of stock is not in extensive use, and in the few cases in which this type of
stock is outstanding there are two obstacles: (i) the dividend on participating
preferred may not be taxable;"1 and (2) the common stockholders must be given
dividends along with the preferred in the "distribution" of the entire net
income. As a practical matter, therefore, it seems that unless a taxable stock
dividend on common stock is available most corporations must use some other
method of shifting their tax burden.
While it is fairly clear that any stock dividend issued to a non-participating
preferred shareholder will be taxable under the reasoning of the Koshland case,
discussed infra, it appears to most writers that stock dividends on the common
stock will not be taxable except in the case in which a corporation having both
preferred and common stock outstanding pays a dividend in preferred. This
opinion is based upon an examination of the leading stock dividend cases. It
has long been held that common stock issued as a dividend on common stock
is not taxable as income.r3 The certificates owned by a common stockholder
have been held to represent a certain undivided proportionate interest in the
enterprise as a whole, and not an interest in the corporate assets.' 4 Conse-
11 For example, action declaring dividends in preferred stock was taken by the Caterpillar
Tractor Co. and the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway. See Comm. & Fin. Chron. 2201, 2360, 2669
(1936). On October 21, 1936, the Greyhound Corporation of Chicago voted a dividend on the
common stock payable in preferred on December 21 to stock of record December io, calling
at the same time for redemption on January i, 1937, of all outstanding preferred stock.
Chicago Daily News, October 21, 1936.
See the discussion of this type of stock at P. 321 infra.
13 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
'4 According to Mr. Justice Pitney in the Eisner case, 252 U.S. 189, 208, the common
shareholder's certificate shows that he or his assignors have contributed capital to the enter-
prise and that he is entitled: (3) to have the property of the company devoted to the attain-
ment of the common objects; (2) to an interest in the enterprise proportionate to his capital;
(3) to vote at stockholders' meetings; (4) to receive a proportionate share of dividends when
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quently when more common stock is issued to the stockholder in proportion to
his original holdings he still has exactly the same proportionate interest in the
whole enterprise as he had before the dividend; his new and old certificates
together represent neither more nor less rights than the original certificates.
Yet it has also been held that a dividend on non-participating preferred stock
paid in common stock is taxable. 5 Here the stockholder in effect obtains a new
set of rights in the corporate enterprise, apart from those which he previously
had, and in addition to them.,6 While his gain is quite evidently not at the
expense of the corporation but at the expense of the common stockholders-
since the dividend reduces the proportionate interests of all common stock-
holders but separates nothing from the corporate assets-yet the test of income
is gain to the stockholder and not loss to the corporation.17 Consequently the
newly acquired set of rights, which in no sense conflicts with or dilutes any
previous rights which the stockholder had, may reasonably be treated in the
same manner as any other newly acquired property having a market value.
For similar reasons it seems clear that a dividend on non-participating pre-
ferred paid in preferred constitutes taxable income. ,8 On the other hand there
is authority for the opinion that preferred stock issued as a dividend on com-
mon stock, where only common was previously outstanding, is not taxable
income to the common stockholder.9 The common stockholder receiving pre-
ferred shares does seem to get some new interest: the right to precede the com-
declared; (5) to receive a proportionate share of the assets on dissolution. Short of liquidation
or dividend declarations, the stockholder has no right to withdraw any part of the capital or
profits of the enterprise; his interest pertains not to any part of the assets but to the entire
business.
IS Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
x6 As a preferred shareholder, the stockholder was entitled (i) to receive a fixed amount per
share in dividends each year, and to have the dividends accumulate until paid; (2) to receive
a fixed amount out of the assets of the corporation on liquidation. After the dividend he still
has exactly the same rights, and in addition the right to vote at meetings, to receive a certain
proportion of all dividends declared to the common stockholders, and to receive a certain
proportion of the assets available on liquidation to the common stockholders.
7 This is evidently the import of the two tests of income suggested in the Eisner case. The
first is the severance of something from the assets of the corporation for the separate use of the
shareholder; the second is a change in the proportionate interest of the shareholder in the
corporate enterprise. The one is based on a loss to the corporation and a corresponding gain
to the stockholder; the other on gain to the shareholder regardless of the effect upon the cor-
poration itself.
1s A preferred dividend paid on non-participating preferred stock will always carry an addi-
tional set of independent rights having some value. These additional rights would become
valueless to the shareholder only if in the event of a future liquidation the amount of assets
available for distribution was not more than the total amount of the preference of the pre-
ferred stock outstanding before the dividend.
19 Commissioner v. Brown, 69 F. (2d) 602 (C.C.A. 7th 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 570
(1934); Horrman v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. -, Dec. 9500 (C.C.H.), Oct. 21, 1936. But cf.
Regulations 94, art. 115-7 (1936).
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mon stockholders in sharing both dividends and assets. Yet all these advan-
tages are over himself as a common stockholder. There exists no other class of
stockholders at whose expense the common stockholders can possibly have
gained; and since the corporation has not assumed any additional obligation to
its stockholders, the entire "gain" has been at the expense of the stockholders
themselves. The likelihood of serious dispute on any of these types of dividends
is not great; so that in practice the disputes, if any, will probably center upon
the payment of preferred stock to the common stockholders of a corporation
having stock of both kinds outstanding. Disputes over the taxability of a divi-
dend in common on participating preferred stock are less likely; because the
objections available in the preferred-on-common situation apply with somewhat
less force, and because the type of stock is uncommon.
The preferred-on-common dividend assumes practical importance not only
because it is the one type of dividend on common stock which gives the recipient
some semblance of a new interest, but also because most corporations do have
both preferred and common stock outstanding. The preferred-on-common
dividend would be one of the most advantageous to such corporations. It is
usually true that where the management holds most of the common stock, pre-
ferred stock is rather widely distributed to the public. If the earnings are large
the management must either distribute common to the preferred, which will
dilute its own interests; or it must distribute preferred and offset the creation
of additional preferences ahead of its common by issuing preferred to itself.
On the other hand, if it is the common which is widely held, it will be necessary
to distribute a preferred-on-common dividend in order to obtain a sufficient
dividends-paid credit by the stock dividend method. Consequently it seems
that the possibility of a widespread use of taxable stock dividends to avoid sur-
tax liability depends very largely upon the possibility of issuing preferred stock
as a taxable dividend to the common stockholders. There are serious obstacles,
however, to a conclusion that such a dividend constitutes taxable income.
If the function of this note were to predict what the Supreme Court would
in fact do if the case were presented, we should have to take account of the
fact that the Treasury Department, ° the Board of Tax appeals,"2 and most
commentators are of the opinion that the preferred-on-common dividend is
taxable income;" and we should have to consider the probability that the
Court would yield to the expediency of allowing corporations to avoid the sur-
20 70 Treas. Dec. no. 7 (Int. Rev. 4674), art. ii5-3 example (3) (1936).
2 Annie M. Pfeiffer, B.T.A. Dec. 9444-F (C.C.H. Memo.), June 27, 1936; H. C. Gowran,
32 B.T.A. 820 (1935); Jas. H. Torrens, 3z B.T.A. 787 (1934); Daisy M. Ward, 29 B.T.A.
1251 (1933).
See, for example, Magill, Taxable Income 47 (1936); Hendricks, The Surtax on Undis-
tributed Profits of Corporations, 46 Yale L.J. 19, 40 (1936); Peper, Corporate Policy under
the Surtax on Undistributed Profits, 22 Wash. U. L. Q. i, 14 (1936); Schulman, Undistributed
Profits Tax Avoidance after the Koshland Case, 14 Tax Mag. 703, 704 (1936); 5o Harv. L.
Rev. 332, 334-5 (1936); 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 83, i03-04 (1936).
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tax and of upholding the status quo as established by treasury and board rulings.
We should also have to take account of the fact that the decision in Eisner v.
Macomber has been severely criticized, and that if the necessity should arise the
Court might either overrule that decision or modify its original meaning by
means of an inconsistent decision distinguishable only "on the facts" of the
case presented. The purpose here, however, is to present an analysis based on
the assumption that the Eisner case still represents the law.
An analysis of the concept of income as developed in the federal taxation
cases seems to indicate not only that the preferred-on-common dividend lacks
some of the important characteristics of "income" but also that it has some of
the characteristics of mere capital increase, which has heretofore been dis-
tinguished from income.23 It seems to be accepted in all discussions of income
that income involves a realization of gain24 Partly in reliance on this common
understanding and partly in reliance on statutes and decided cases, we may
adopt a scale of types of gains running from what seems the most clearly realized
to what seems the most clearly unrealized. Accordingly we may list the realized
gains as follows: (a) cash received outright, as for services rendered; (b) cash
representing the excess of selling price over cost of property sold; (c) new
property other than cash, but readily salable for cash, received outright and
apart from any property previously owned; (d) new property, valuable but not
readily marketable, received outright and apart from any property previously
owned; (e) the excess of market value of new property, received in exchange
for property previously owned, over the cost of the original property.2S Beyond
these are what have been considered unrealized gains: (f) simple increments in
the market value of property presently owned; (g) simple increments in the
valuation of property not readily marketable; (h) potential or contingent
gains, such as the expectancy of gains in the future.
The previously recognized realized gains on corporate stock holdings include
only: (i) cash dividends; (2) stock of another corporation received as a divi-
dend; (3) dividends received in stock of the issuing corporation, but repre-
senting a new and separate interest in the corporation, without changing the
rights represented by the former interest; (4) excess value of new stock of a
different company received in exchange for stock previously held. Thus it has
been held that cash dividends, whether entirely out of earnings or partially in
3 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. i89, 207 (1920).
4 Income is a gain derived from capital or labor or both combined; it is not a gain accruing
to capital; it is not growth or increment of value in the investment; it is gain proceeding from
the property, severed from the capital; it is gain coming in, being derived, i.e., drawn or re-
ceiled by the recipient for his separate use. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 2o7 (1920).
See note 14 supra for a statement of the nature of a stockholder's capital. See, generally,
Rottschaefer, The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 637 (i929).
2sSee 48 Stat. 703 (1934); 49 Stat. 1678, 1682 (1936); 26 U.S.C.A. §§ iii(b), i12(a),
I13(a) (1936).
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liquidation, 2 and even though accompanied by an offer of stock of the cor-
poration for an amount equal to the amount of the cash dividend, 27 are taxable
income. Stock of another company received as a dividend is income, whether
the stock was held as an investment by the company paying the dividend,'2 or
was received by the company in payment for a transfer of part of the assets to
a new corporation organized for the purpose of carrying on part of the original
business;29 provided the other company is essentially a different corporation
from the one paying the dividend.30 A stockholder who receives as a dividend
26 Kentucky Tob. Co. v. Lucas, s F. (2d) 723 (D. C. Ky. 1925); Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F.
(2d) 691 (D. C. Ky. 1925), aff'd 13 F. (2d) 1022 (C.C.A. 6th i926), cerf. denied, 273 U.S. 721
(1926).
27 This was admitted in Eisner v. Macomber and has not since been questioned; but excep-
tions are made where the "cash dividend" could not in reality be used by the stockholder for
anything but the stock purchase, Dietz v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 944 (IV. Va. 1933); or
where the "cash dividend" is issued with the understanding that most of the stockholders will
take stock and they do take stock. Zellerbach v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 1076 (1925).
28 Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347 (x9x8).
29In Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (192x), a corporation had an undivided
surplus greater than the value of certain of its properties. It transferred these properties to a
new corporation organized in the same state to carry on part of the business, and received in
exchange the capital stock of the new corporation. This stock was later distributed to the
stockholders of the original corporation. Held, the new stock represented separate evidence
of the former interest of the stockholder in the undivided surplus of the corporation and was
taxable as income. (Here the dividend operated in the same manner as a cash dividend. The
assets of the corporation were less after the distribution of the stock; the st6ckholders retained
their proportionate interest in the corporation; but the market value of their holdings in the
corporation was less, and in its place they had stock of a new corporation which could be sold
without destroying their former interest in the original corporation.)
In United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 5S6 (192I), a corporation transferred all of its assets
to a new corporation organized in another state, receiving in exchange (i) common stock of
the new corporation equal to the par value of the common stock of the old, which it held as an
asset against its outstanding common stock, and (2) common stock of the new corporation
equal to twice the par value of the old common outstanding, which it distributed to its com-
mon stockholders as dividends. Held, the new stock represented a separation of the stock-
holder's interest in the accumulated earnings, distinct from his original capital interest repre-
sented by the old common stock, and was taxable as income. The market value of the entire
holdings of the stockholder was the same before and after the transaction; but the market
value had previously represented in the aggregate both the original capital interest and the
interest in accumulated earnings, whereas the transaction separated these interests and made
each distinguishable from the other.
30 In Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924), the transaction as interpreted by the Court was
as follows: The original stockholders sold half their interest ($2,500,000 par value) to an
incoming stockholder for $7,5ooooo. The corporation was reorganized in the same state, with
the same assets, liabilities, and essentially the same charter; so that actually the "new" cor-
poration was substantially identical with the old. The old stockholders turned in their $2,500,-
coo par value stock of the old corporation and received in return $25,oooooo par value of the
stock of the new corporation. He/d, the stock distribution was substantially the distribution
of a stock dividend, non-taxable; since after that transaction the old stockholder had exactly
the same proportionate interest in substantially the same corporation as before the exchange.
He was, of course, taxable on any profit he made from the sale of half his shares.
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shares of stock which represent a new interest in the same corporation, separate
and distinct from the former interest, receives new property of value, independ-
ent of property previously owned, which constitutes taxable income.3' Where
stock formerly held is exchanged for stock of another corporation, the increased
value of the new stock over the original purchase price of the old is income,
whether the transaction was a simple trade of stock between parties, 32 or the
new corporation was a result of the reorganization of the old corporation 3-
provided the "new" corporation is not substantially identical with the old.34
Stock dividends and exchanges of a form different from those already enu-
merated have previously been held to constitute unrealized gains, so far as the
cases have come to the Supreme Court for decision. The inference to be drawn
from these cases is that income requires the receipt of something new, separate
from the original capital interest. Thus a stock dividend which represents partly
the original capital interest and partly a new interest in accumulated but undi-
vided surplus does not constitute income. In Eisner v. Macomber it was con-
tended that the new common stock certificates received by a common stock-
holder measured the extent to which gains accumulated by the corporation had
enriched the stockholder. However, it was answered by the Court that such
enrichment would depend upon whether the stockholder had owned his stock
during the entire period within which the gains represented by the dividend
3' Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 44X (1936); Commissioner v. Tillotson, 76 F. (2d) 189
(C.C.A. 6th 1935); A. M. Clark v. Commissioner, Dec. 9439-H (C.C.H. Memo), May 23, 1936.
32 For example, A buys a share of X stock for $ioo. Later, when the market value is $300,
A exchanges this with B for a share of Y stock also worth $300. A is taxable on a gain of $200.
See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ iii(b), 112(a), 113(a) (1936).
33 In Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923), a corporation, through trustees, transferred
all its properties to two new corporations, receiving back all the stock and bonds of the new
corporations. The trustees retained the bonds and exchanged all the stock for all the stock
of a new holding company organized in another state; then distributed all the stock and bonds
in their hands to the original stockholders. The stockholder bought his original 26% interest
in the old corporation for $26,o0o; and after the exchange held 26% of the stocks and bonds
of the new corporations, worth nearly $i,6oo,ooo. Held, the difference between the value of
the new and the cost of the old was income. The stock of the holding company was an interest
in an essentially different company from the original; the holding company could have sold
its entire interest in the original enterprise without affecting the rights of its stockholders.
In Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925), a New Jersey corporation having outstand-
ing $iS,ooo,ooo par value of 7% voting preferred stock and $15,oooooo par value of common
stock transferred its assets and liabilities to a new Delaware corporation capitalized at $20,-
ooo,ooo of 6% non-voting preferred and $75,000,000 of common. The preferred of the new
corporation was exchanged at ij shares for i, and the common at 5 shares for i. Held, the
new corporation was not substantially identical with the old, but had different powers and
incidents. The difference between the cost of the old and the market value of the new shares
constituted income; since the transaction represented an exchange of properties and not a
retention of the same proportionate interest in the same corporation.
34 Where the new corporation is substantially identical with the old, there is not an ex-
change of one set of properties for a different set. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (x924); Marr
v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 542 (1925).
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were accumulating; and further that enrichment through increase in the value
of the capital investment is not income in any proper sense of the word.35 In
Towne v. Eisner, a similar contention had been answered by the statement that
if the common stockholder gained any advantage by such a transaction, it was
not the market value of the certificates received.36 Not every new right or
interest represented in a stock dividend can make the stock dividend income.
Thus in the case of a common stock dividend on common stock, the payment
of the dividend is a recognition of the fact that past earnings of the corporation
have enriched the shareholder; that the enhanced market value of his shares
has been the reflection of a substantial addition to the corporate assets, rather
than a mere rise occasioned by extrinsic circumstances. That this is in a real
sense a gain to the stockholder is indicated by the fact that in the case of
partnerships the individual partners are taxable on their respective shares of the
annual earnings, even though those earnings are permanently reinvested in the
business. Nevertheless, while the stock dividend is a recognition of a gain, the
new certificate received does not represent a gain separated from the stock-
holder's original capital interest. It does represent an increase in the extent of
his financial interest; but it also represents part of the rights in the corporation
which were formerly represented by his original shares. The old and new shares
taken together now represent the legal interest in the corporate entity which was
formerly represented by the old shares alone. In this respect the common-on-
common dividend is essentially different from the common-on-preferred; for the
latter now represents the addition to the shareholder's financial interest, for-
merly represented by the accrued dividend, in the form of shares which carry
a new legal interest in the corporate entity entirely apart from the former
interest. It seems, therefore, that any dividend which does not adequately
separate the new interest acquired from the previous capital interest owned
should not be held to be income to the shareholder unless the Eisner case is to
a corresponding extent modified.
Preferred stock received as a dividend on common, where both types are
already outstanding, lacks several of the attributes of a realized gain and
retains several attributes held in Towne v. Eisner, Eisner v. Macomber, and
subsequent cases to characterize capital increase rather than realized gain.
Thus, except in the case of exchanges of stock, all gains previously held to con-
stitute income have been in a form which is severable from the original interest
without impairing the proportionate interest of the shareholder in the assets,
earnings, and control of the original corporation.37 In the case of an exchange,
there is an entirely new interest which does not conflict with the old because
no old interest is retained. On the other hand, all non-severable interests have
35 252 U.S. 189, 214.
36 245 U.S. 418, 426 (i9g8).
37 See the discussion of the Rockefeller and Phellis cases in note 29 supra; also the Kosh-
land case, discussed at p. 314 supra, and note io.
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been held not to constitute income.38 This distinction is reasonable in the light
of what is commonly regarded as a realized gain: for something new, of value
and independent of other interests, is almost as clearly realized as if it were
cash; whereas a new interest which is inseparably bound up with an old cannot
be fully realized by conversion into cash without disturbing the previous inter-
est. Yet where preferred stock is received as a dividend on common, the new
and the old certificates taken together represent the old interest plus the chance
of sharing with the preferred stockholders in dividends and assets if in the future
the earnings are reduced or assets are depleted.39 The new interest not only
appears to be contingent, but the new stock received is not severable from the
old without leaving the stockholder's rights subordinate to additional prefer-
ences in dividends and in share of the assets on liquidation.40 Further, in the
previous cases the new interest or the newly severed interest has been sub-
stantially equivalent in extent to the market value of the new shares received,
the value at which the income was fixed; and where the new interest was not
substantially equivalent in extent to the value of the unit sought to be taxed,
it has been held that taxation was improper.4" This distinction again seems
founded on a clear notion of what constitutes a realized gain. However, since
common stock subject to additional preferences is not ordinarily worth its
previous value, the effect of a preferred-on-common dividend-even though it
may increase the total value of the holdings-should be to depress the value
of the common shares; so that the market value of the new preferred will
ordinarily be greater than the amount that can be attributed to the new inter-
ests acquired. The value is due partly to the preference and partly to the trans-
fer of surplus formerly available for common dividends to the account of the
new preferred, at the expense of the common stock.
While it seems clear from the preceding examination that the preferred-on-
common dividend does not fall within the reasons stated in the Koshland case
for holding a stock dividend to be income, nevertheless a number of commenta-
tors have suggested that the slightest change in the stockholder's interest in the
corporation is sufficient to take the dividend out of the class controlled by the
38 Cf. note 24 supra.
39 If the earnings become less than sufficient to pay the common stockholders an amount
equal to the preferred dividends, there will be some advantage in holding preferred stock and
sharing the available dividends with the preferred holders; and similarly, if on dissolution the
amount left for the common stockholders is less than the share paid to preferred holders, there
will be advantage in holding some preferred.
40 It was said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Marr. v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541 (1925),
that common stock subject to the prior claims of $20,000,000 of 6% preferred is substantially
different from common stock subject to the prior claims of $15,ooo,ooo of 7% preferred. The
same argument applies here. An interest is not strictly "severable" if the result of its sever-
ance is to leave the original interest less than before.
41 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,426 (1918). See p. 319 supra.
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Eisner case and to bring it within the exceptions developed in later cases.4 The
source of this opinion seems to be a quite evidently erroneous interpretation of
the cases involving exchange of shares on reorganization. The difference be-
tween Weiss v. Steam on the one hand, and Cullinan v. Walker and Marr v.
United States on the other is that in the one case the reorganized corporation
was held to be substantially identical with the old; so that no real change of
corporate identity took place, and hence the old stock was not in effect ex-
changed for stock of another corporation: whereas in the other two cases
relatively slight changes in the corporate entity were held to make the reor-
ganized corporation essentially different from the old; so that there was in
effect an exchange of shares of one corporation for shares of another. The ques-
tion in these cases was not whether a change in the stockholder's interest made
his new stock income, but whether a sufficient change had taken place in the
old corporation to make the transaction by which old stock was exchanged for
new an exchange of a set of property interests in one corporation for a set in an
essentially different corporation. The results to the stockholders followed from
a change of corporate identity, and not from a slight alteration of their inter-
ests in the same corporation. The conclusion seems irresistible, therefore, not
only that authority is lacking for the opinion that a preferred-on-common
dividend is taxable, but also that the principles stated in well-established de-
cisions tend to uphold the contrary opinion.
Of less practical importance, but no less illuminating analytically, is the
dividend on participating preferred stock paid in common. The principles
previously stated apply also to this type of dividend; yet some of the elements
present in the case of common on non-participating preferred are also present
here. In the usual type of participating preferred stock, the preferred first
receives its stated share of the dividend being distributed, or of the assets on
liquidation. Then the common receives a like amount per share; and afterward
the two types share alike. It can be seen that, unlike the case of preferred-on-
common, this transaction increases the present book value of the holdings of
the preferred shareholder receiving the dividend, and also the share in dividend
distributions.43 The preferred holder has received some new interest: that of a
42For example, "A shareholder may be held to have realized income from a corporate dis-
tribution of stock, if its result is to change his proportionate interest in the corporation or to
confer upon him different types of rights" (citing Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925))
(italics added) 5o Harv. L. Rev. 332, 334 (1936).
A distribution to common shareholders of preferred stock having the same rights as pre-
ferred already outstanding gives the shareholder something essentially different from the
equity in the corporation which he already had, within the meaning of the test in the Marr
case. Hendricks, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations, 46 Yale L.J. i9, 40
(1936). See also Magill, Realization of Income through Corporate Distributions, 36 Col. L.
Rev. 519, 536-37 (1936)-
43 To illustrate, suppose a corporation having outstanding i,ooo shares of participating pre-
ferred entitled to $s per year or one share of common stock, at the option of the directors;
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common shareholder, entitled to a part of all dividends and assets distributed to
the common stock. Yet part of this new interest has been acquired at the ex-
pense of the interests formerly represented by the preferred stock; for the pre-
ferred must now share all distributions with a larger class of common shares.
Each preferred share now represents a smaller proportionate interest in any
excess distributions over and above the amount of its preference. Consequently
this is a case in which the shareholder undoubtedly does receive an increased
proportionate interest in the corporation; but in which the new interest is only
partially distinct from the former interest. The new certificate represents
partly gain secured at the expense of the common shareholders, and partly the
old interest in excess distributions. It seems impossible to say, consistently with
the Eisner case, that the new shares of common stock received by the holder of
participating preferred represent a gain derived from the capital, severed from
the original capital interest; yet it seems impractical to allow a stockholder to
escape taxation on a new and valuable property interest merely because it is
imperfectly dissociated from his original capital. As Mr. Justice Holmes said
in his dissent in Eisner v. Macomber, the purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment
was to get rid of nice questions of this kind.44
PROHIBITING REFUNDS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAXES*
Under the authority of the unconstitutional Agricultural Adjustment Act,'
the Internal Revenue Bureau collected processing taxes of approximately a
billion dollars.2 At the time the act was passed the statutory and common law
provided for refunds of unconstitutionally-collected taxes regardless of whether
or not the tax had been shifted to consumers,3 and there was no general pro-
and also io,ooo shares of common stock. Suppose that in a given year the earnings are $275,-
ooo, and that these are distributed in cash. The preferred will receive its $5 per share and
$2o extra; and the common likewise will receive $25. But suppose that in 5 successive years
the directors issue the preferred dividends in common stock and make no further distributions.
Now the same $275,000 will be distributed, $5 per share and $13.75 extra; but the share of
each preferred shareholder, holding one preferred and 5 common, will be $5 and $107.5o extra.
The share of the preferred stock has been reduced in the ratio of 25.0 to 18.75; but the share
of the preferred shareholder has been increased in the ratio of 112.5 to 25.0. The preferred share-
holder would make a similar gain with respect to share in the assets on dissolution, or book
value.
44 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920).
* For related problems see Field, The Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 5oi (1932).
'48 Stat. 31 (I933); 7 U.S.C.A. § 6oi et seq. (1936), hereafter referred to as the AAA. It
was held unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. i (1936).
14 Tax Mag. io8 (i936).
3 U.S. Rev. Stats. § 3220 (1878); 45 Stat. 996 (1928); 26 U.S.C.A. § 1670(a) (1) (1935). See
notes 14 and x5 infra.
